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This paper examines the literature on the rule of law and economic development, and in 
particular the influential argument by La Porta et al., on the superiority of the Anglo-
American common law system in fostering financial development. In this paper I show 
that however compelling their argument might be, legal traditions and institutions do 
not determine the nature of the state, nor its likely role in the economy—nor do they 
critically determine the course of economic development. I build my case by examining 
the real and informal mechanisms of state intervention in the economy in East Asia. 
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This UNU-WIDER research project is an attempt to open up the academic debate on the 
role of institutions in economic development, to include the very real ways in which 
people, under different historical constraints, devise ways to organize their social and 
economic lives. It is an attempt to discover, then, the hidden rationalities in social 
behavior that may look irrational and even reprehensible from the perspective of the 
reigning economic orthodoxy regarding institutions of growth, but which may have their 
own methods to madness in propelling growth. 
This paper is concerned with the rule of law, types of law, and economic development. 
While the rule of law is widely thought to go hand in hand with economic development, 
international financial institutions (barred through their charters from any political 
interference in member countries) have largely eschewed exploring the relationship 
between law and politics—until quite recently. But economic theorists who write on law 
have always had their eyes cocked on the state and its power. F.A. Hayek defined the 
rule of law as an understanding that government in all its actions is bound by the rules 
fixed and announced before hand, preventing it from stultifying the individual efforts by 
ad hoc action (1944, 1972: 72). 
This Hayekian insight has not been lost to a group of economists who have taken the 
argument about the rule of law to an extreme: different legal traditions have different 
thumb prints of the state, and the legal tradition that bears the least imprint is the one 
mostly likely to promote economic growth. More specifically, the argument was that a 
common law tradition, which arose at arms-length to the state, was more likely to 
promote economic development. By the same token, the civil law tradition, which abets 
the power of the state, was more likely to privilege state intervention in economic 
processes, and hence less growth-promoting.  
In this paper I will argue that however compelling this argument may be, legal traditions 
and institutions do not determine the nature of the state (although they may be reflected 
in it), nor its likely role in the economy—nor do they critically determine the course of 
economic development. Instead of common law leading to a minimal state and the 
broadest extension of the market, or civil law leading to state intervention in the 
economy and corresponding shrinkage of market activity, there may be no relationship 
at all between forms of law and the role of the state. 
I will begin by reviewing the core literature on the rule of law and economic growth; the 
influential arguments of some institutional economists on the relationship between law, 
finance and government. In particular I will examine the influential argument by La 
Porta et al., on the superiority of the Anglo-American common law system (as versus 
the civil law tradition of continental Europe, Latin America, and East Asia) in fostering 
financial development (often understood to be synonymous with economic 
development). I will seek to demonstrate the inadequacy of these arguments on the rule 
of law and economic development, by flashing them against the backdrop of East Asia. 
I will first argue that these mechanisms of state intervention in the economy (Gyosei 
shido in Japanese and its direct transliteration, Haengjŏng Chido in Korea) were highly 
informal mechanisms which had at best a tangential relationship to formal law or law 
traditions, and thus this experience contradicts the argument that it is the structure of 
formal law that determines the nature of the relationship between the state, economy 
and society. Administrative guidance developed both in the ‘civil law’ countries like 
Japan and Korea, but also in a ‘common law’ country like Malaysia—in the latter case   2
an elaborate and sophisticated common law system still posed no barrier to arbitrary 
decisions by the chief executive.  
Second, I will also show that the process of reform itself has developed out of the same 
pre-existing patterns of state intervention, in particular in the Republic of Korea, one of 
the success stories of reform since 1997. I will argue that the Korean government has 
used administrative guidance as an effective policy tool to restructure the corporate 
sector and to bring about neoliberal reforms—precisely in the direction of 
accountability and transparency. More importantly perhaps, I will argue that 
administrative guidance bears little relationship to either a civil law or a common law 
background. This experience of state action that was simultaneously heavy-handed and 
successful, may therefore illustrate that rapid economic reform in a developing society 
will bear fruit most quickly and effectively in countries already having a more 
centralised and powerful government, with the trick being to direct that state toward a 
commitment to economic growth. 
Common law and civil law 
Douglass North has been a prolific advocate of the idea that states throughout history 
have more often been inimical to economic growth than conducive of it, and that the 
key to economic development is to get states to behave as ‘impartial third parties’, or to 
adapt a role sometimes called that of a ‘night watchman state’ (North 1981; 1990). A 
good system of impersonal exchange combined with third-party enforcement of the 
rules of the game, has been ‘the critical underpinning of successful modern economies 
involved in the complex contracting necessary for modern economic growth’ (North 
1990: 35). By and large, the most effective of those modern economies have been ones 
that sprang from the common law tradition. 
A more detailed argument for the virtues of a common law tradition comes from Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney (hereafter 
LLSV). Through an empirical study of the determinants of quality government in a 
large cross-section of countries, the authors assess state performance using various 
measures of government intervention, public sector efficiency, public good provision, 
size of government, and political freedom (LLSV 1999). ‘Good government’ is what is 
good for ‘economic development’, and ‘economic development’ is really about the 
security of property rights—lack of intervention by the government, benign regulation, 
and low taxation (p. 225). Because common law developed in England as a defence of 
Parliament and property owners against the attempts by the sovereign to regulate and 
expropriate them, and because it is made by judges who put their emphasis on the 
private rights of individuals and especially on their property rights, the LLSV authors 
see the it as the best legal system for economic development, as they define it. 
Civil law, on the other hand, is seen as an instrument of the state in expanding its 
power—as illustrated by the fact that the greatest codes were introduced by Napoleon 
and Bismarck—and this type of law focuses on discovering a just solution to a dispute 
(often from the point of view of the State) rather than on following a just procedure that 
protects individuals against the State. Not surprising, the LLSV authors find that the use 
of a more interventionist legal system, such as the French civil law, predict inferior 
economic performance (p. 224).   3
Investor protection, which is interchangeably used as economic development, is also 
interchangeable with good corporate governance, which they define as ‘a set of 
mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation 
by the insiders’ (LLSV 2000: 1). This expropriation may take the form of transfer 
pricing, asset stripping, investor dilution and outright stealing, with the authors finding 
several practices which may be legal (like investor dilution) having the same effect as 
stealing. Once again they argue that common law countries offer the strongest 
protections for outside investors, having judges who base themselves on precedents 
‘inspired by principles such as fiduciary duty or fairness’. Effective investor protection, 
according to the LLSV authors, enhances savings and also channels these savings ‘into 
real investment;’ the development of strong financial protection ‘allows capital to flow 
toward the more productive uses, and thus improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation’. Civil law countries, on the other hand, offer much weaker protection to 
foreign investors, with laws made by legislatures rather than judges looking at 
precedent. 
History, however, does not support the contention of the LLSV authors. The path of 
financial market development have not been as linear, but instead show many 
fluctuations and departures in countries like the US, France, Germany and Britain. For 
instance in 1913, France’s stock market capitalisation as a fraction of GDP was almost 
twice that of the US, but then decreased to almost one fourth of the US by 1980, and in 
1999, the two countries seem to have converged (Rajan and Zingales 2000: 4). In the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Germany (a civil country) also outpaced England (a 
common country) in both the volume of total market issues, and the proportion of 
issuance consisting of equity. Thus it was not legal or cultural factors that determined 
the level of financial system development, but political factors such as the support by 
government and interest groups for financial institution growth that determined the 
course of development. 
In fact, whereas it took over a century and a half for the English common law system to 
work out something like the limited liability form to its satisfaction, a mere ten years 
were required for the French civil code to emulate it. The almost instant success of 
continental European Governments in promoting financial development seems to 
indicate that what is critical is the will of the government to develop the financial 
market, and furthermore, that financial reform may bear fruit more quickly in the more 
centralised governments of the civil law tradition, than in the weaker governments 
associated with the common law tradition. 
Another example along these lines would be the fairly remarkable experience in Latin 
America, a region made up almost entirely of civil law tradition countries, of 
governments moving quickly toward market-oriented policies. Indeed, market-oriented 
policies do not require changes in the legal traditions of given countries, so much as the 
emergence of new political leadership committed to change; effective leaders can not 
only implement new market-oriented measures, but can also change public opinion and, 
over time, the nature of legal practice itself.  
The concern with the origins of the legal system also has the effect of putting the cart 
before the horse. Investor protection tended to develop in most countries only after the 
period of transplanting major legal systems, and much of that transplantation involved 
civil law countries adopting Anglo-American law. This was particularly true for Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. In other words the historical sequence of events   4
defies a simple categorisation of countries according to the origin of their legal systems 
for laws governing investor protection, in light of the fact that different economies use 
different combinations of substantive and procedural protection in their laws. These 
combinations are the result of repeated legal change that can hardly be traced to the 
origins of an economy’s legal system (Pistor and Wellons 1999: 139-141). 
Most tellingly, Kevin Davis and Michael Trebilcock (1999), in a study conducted for 
the World Bank, argued that there is little evidence of a causal relationship between law 
and economic development; empirical studies of the relationship between growth and 
law do not point to causality. They scrutinised the economic impact of property rights, 
including ‘titling’, ‘privatisation’, ‘alienability’, ‘land redistribution’, concluding that it 
is difficult to say that clear property rights lead to positive economic benefits. They 
obtained the same inconclusive results in examining the economic impact of contract 
laws, taxation law, criminal law, social welfare legislation, human rights, family law, 
and the like. The more daunting challenge, they think, is to enhance ‘the quality of 
institutions charged with the responsibility of enacting laws and regulations’, and that 
exclusive or predominant occupation with the court system inappropriately discounts 
the important role played by government departments and agencies. 
Much of my previous work has been concerned with identifying the specificities of 
‘late’ industrial development, as a way of asking the question, what difference does it 
make when a country industrialises in the middle of the twentieth century, as opposed to 
the early nineteenth century (England) or the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
(Japan)? How do the requirements of industrial strategy, finance, and the role of the 
state differ, depending on when a country begins to industrialise? (Woo 1991). Without 
putting too fine a point on it, from this perspective it seems clear that a common law 
tradition is consonant with early industrial development, in which the private sector is 
much more active than the state in promoting industrialisation, the time frame for 
industrialisation is much more lengthy, and leaders do not have to worry so much about 
competition from countries that have already arrived at an advanced industrial status. 
This sequencing would also suggest that judges have the luxury of time to develop 
precedents on a case-by-case basis. The civil law tradition, to the contrary, is much 
more identified with ‘late’ industrialisers like Germany and Japan, in which the state 
became a resource to be deployed to hasten the process of development and to make up 
or substitute for various disadvantages, like the modest nature of private sector business 
or the middle class.  
One of the ‘advantages of backwardness’, in the words of Alexander Gerschenkron, was 
the ability of late industrialisers to copy the earlier industrialisers, and often the state 
was the key institution engaged in doing that. But copying a machine is much easier 
than copying the theory and practice of a law tradition that evolved over centuries, 
through the establishment and subsequent citation of precedent. It was thus far easier to 
write a code authorising desired economic behaviour, than splice a common law 
tradition based on long historical evolution into effective day-to-day practice in the hot-
house conditions of the twentieth century development.   5
Japan: informality, administrative guidance, and ‘rule-by-law’ 
It is a curiosity that Japan endured first an unconditional surrender and then a seven-
year occupation by the standard-bearer of the rule of law, the United States, and yet law 
was more important in Japan before 1945 than it was in the long period of rapid growth 
that ensued after the Occupation ended. A civil law code modelled on German examples 
played a significant role in the eighty years of Imperial Japan after the Meiji Restoration 
in 1868, but with the advent of the postwar democracy came a relative shrinkage of the 
legal sector. As Japan became a model of postwar industrial growth, formal legal 
institutions played at best a back-up role to informal mechanisms, especially the well-
known state practice of administrative guidance. Instead, economic policy was formed 
and implemented largely through informal mechanisms, consciously shielded from the 
interference of the formal legal system. The courts were relatively inactive, citizens 
rarely brought actions to them on behalf of individual rights or privileges, and consumer 
protection was minimal, at least through lawsuits brought to the courts. Intervention by 
the courts in the implementation of economic policy on behalf of private parties was 
rare to the point of non-existence. Foreign firms were on the outside looking in on 
policy formation, of course, and had little recourse to the courts to protect their interests 
(Upham 2000).  
During the American occupation a new constitution replaced the Meiji Constitution 
with its continental notion of the Reichstaatsprinzip, and one of the major advances of 
the new constitution was to abolish the Administrative court and introduce the Anglo-
American system of judicial review. Did that eventuate in grafting a system of common 
law onto the Japanese experience of civil law? Some scholars argue that the predictable 
did indeed happen: that Japanese law thereafter developed in the direction of American 
law, and that in spite of the vast differences in historical, political, economic, and social 
backgrounds of Japan and the US, the postwar system has steadily been ‘proving its 
fitness’, with case law and precedent developing rapidly (Hashimoto 1963: 271). Or as 
another scholar puts it, the old practice of ‘rule by law’ (hochishugi) gave way after 
1945 to the ‘rule of law’ (ho no shihai) (Takayanagi 1963: 13). 
Most others, however, do not think that postwar Japanese legal practice has ever come 
very close to resembling the Anglo-American system. Indeed, the translation of the 
above terms is quite revealing. In Japan hochishugi (pŏpch’ijuŭi in Korean) is used 
without carrying the negative connotation that in the West would be attributed to the 
phrase ‘rule by law’, and this is not a matter of poor translation. Instead the phrase 
bespeaks the difficulty of translating or conveying liberal conceptions in a statist 
society; even the term ‘liberal’ developed the connotation in Japan and Korea of 
conservatism, so the distinction may also be lost between the (liberal) ‘rule of law’ and 
the (illiberal) ‘rule by law’. Or as a legal scholar puts this point,  
[In] the introduction of rules and principles of common-law origin … it 
is quite natural that those rules and principles were interpreted by 
Japanese jurists according to the civilian [i.e. civil law] methods in which 
they were experts. If one compares commentaries on the Philippine 
constitution with those on the new Japanese constitution, he will be 
surprised at the striking difference in the mode of exposition and 
interpretation, even in cases in which the constitutional text is exactly the 
same… . (Takayanagi 1963: 37)   6
Nor did the Japanese adoption of American-inspired law make people more litigious, as 
one might expect; instead they were far less litigious than citizens in any other 
advanced-industrial country, and even less litigious than they had been before 1945. The 
average civil litigation rate for 1892-1940 was 146,683 (or 26.8 per million people), 
whereas the average for 1950-90 was 176,211 (or 16.6 per million people); in 1962, 
litigation per million people had not yet come back to the level achieved in 1916 (Pistor 
and Wellons 1999: 230). Thus the ubiquitous lawyer jokes that Americans love are 
inexplicable in Japan (‘What do you call 10,000 lawyers found on the bottom of the 
ocean? A good start’, etc.). This experience speaks quite soberly to the travelability of 
the arguments made by the LLSV scholars and others of the law-and-economics school. 
That is: have law (but), won’t travel. 
Instead postwar Japan preferred administrative action to litigious reaction, and even 
though the 1946 Constitution required that administration be based on legislation 
coming out of the Diet, in fact the Diet merely set general guidelines and then 
authorised the bureaucracy to flesh out the rules, which gave bureaucrats substantial 
discretion in practice. Constitutional legality receded as administrative guidance (AG) 
proceeded, a practice that we can usefully define as giving broad discretion to the 
bureaucracy to make, interpret, and enforce detailed rule of economic behavior. Or as 
the most famous analyst of this practice put it, administrative guidance… 
refers to the authority of the government, contained in the laws 
establishing the various ministries, to issue directives (shiji), requests 
(yodo), warnings (keikoku), suggestions (kankoku), and encouragements 
(kansho) to the enterprises or clients within a particular ministry’s 
jurisdiction. Administrative guidance is constrained only by the 
requirement that the ‘guidees’ must come under a given governmental 
organ’s jurisdiction, and although it is not based on any explicit law, it 
cannot violate the law (for example, it is not supposed to violate the 
Antimonopoly Law). (Johnson 1982: 265) 
Not only was administrative discretion very broad, but powerful ministries, 
preeminently the Ministry of Finance (MOF), got away with dusting off interwar laws 
dealing with financial regulation (especially control of foreign exchange and cross-
border financial flows), thus allowing the MOF to change policy by prewar ordinance if 
not by fiat. The MOF thus based its control over the financial sector on the Banking Act 
of 1928 and the Foreign Exchange Control Act of 1933 (Pistor and Wellons 1999: 92-
93, 98). South Korea likewise often based postwar economic regulation on prewar 
(Japanese) law. Administrative guidance also effectively reflected the needs and 
demands of those being ‘guided’. It was a regulatory form for government intervention 
in the economy that has helped to preserve a competitive market economy by 
maximising the freedom of individual firms over economic decisions although behind 
the veil of pervasive government direction (Haley 1986: 108). 
If the role of the MOF, MITI, and the reliance on prewar laws was mitigated by the 
atmosphere of reform and deregulation in the 1980s, and if administrative guidance 
seems at best vestigial in the year 2000, that probably happened because of the inutility 
of state direction in an era of information-age industries and technologies, not because 
someone in Tokyo finally saw the common-law light. Indeed, substantial legal 
scholarship by Michael Young has shown how, even in the atmosphere of change and 
deregulation in the 1980s, when procedures of judicial review were used to confine AG   7
to carefully-defined purposes, judges did not seek to eliminate AG in favor of an ideal 
vision of the rule of law; instead they sought a balance between the good that came from 
administrative flexibility, and the bad that came from excessive bureaucratic intrusion. 
Courts refused to determine the priority of competing claims of rights, as an American 
judge would do, in order to protect individual rights without sacrificing the flexibility 
that AG provided. They were more concerned with bringing AG into line with an 
informal social consensus than with conforming to legal procedure or abstract legal 
principle, as might have happened in a common law system. Rather than giving a 
priority to one side’s view, as in an adversarial legal system, the courts have been 
reluctant to state their position and preferred to rely on societal consensus and informal 
agreement between the involved parties (Young 1984: 923-25, 965-67, 977). Of course 
AG was itself an informal system, and so the remedies for the abuses of administrative 
guidance also had to be informal. 
Have law, will travel: Korea learns from Japan 
One clear case of dramatic international or cross-border learning is the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), where administrative guidance remains the primary tool used by the state 
to intervene in the economy, something that Koreans learned under Japanese imperial 
tutelage before 1945, but also through emulation of Japan’s postwar industrial prowess. 
In Korea, however, there may have been a kind of over-learning, since the use of 
administrative guidance is far more pervasive than in Japan, and in two important ways 
goes to unheard of lengths: first, administrative guidance is not just the province of the 
state ministries, but can be issued directly by the president through the relevant 
ministries and agencies, in an executive-dominant political system where the president 
has far more power than in Japan’s parliamentary democracy. Second, the informalities 
of AG in Japan, limited by formal mechanisms of judicial review and shaped by a prior 
consensus, give way in Korea to AG almost by fiat; extensive consultations do not 
necessarily precede administrative guidance, and judicial review was non-existent 
during the decades of dictatorship and remains weak under the democratic governments 
of the past decade. Befitting Korea’s long authoritarian legacy and its extraordinary 
history of centralising everything in the capital (far more so than in Japan) and then 
concentrating that authority in the hands of the chief executive, administrative guidance 
is more uneven and less consensual, resembling a coercive demand more than an 
informal guidance.  
For much of the period of authoritarian rule and world-beating economic growth 
Korea’s judges were not so much as august interpreters of constitutional intent than 
dependent factotums; at best ‘distinguished bureaucrats’ and at worst ‘expert clerks’ 
(Song 1996a). They were essentially civil servants, and given that the administration of 
justice had little bearing on governmental and political life, their real sphere of influence 
and action was in civil and commercial matters where their expertise was needed to 
adjudicate conflicts among private parties and to rule upon the application of criminal 
laws. Here the power brokers felt no need or interest in interference, so the judges could 
have their realm of autonomy. Given the bureaucratic nature of the judicial system, 
which exercised its own effect on the basic lack of judicial creativity that all observers 
noted, and given the judges’ lack of power even to interpret (let alone create) the law, 
the basic requirements for a judge were to be technically competent, inveterately 
apolitical, risk averse, and preternaturally quiet (Song 1996a: 300-2).   8
What is the legal basis for administrative guidance in Korea? When the president or 
other executive organs of the state intervene into the private sphere of civil society and 
commerce, the legal basis of such intervention must be knowable in advance by the 
subjects of such regulation. In a constitutional order, such state action is subject to 
public scrutiny and if necessary, to legal challenge. It is stated in Article 119(2) of the 
ROK Constitution: 
The state may regulate and coordinate economic affairs in order to 
maintain the balanced growth and stability of the national economy, to 
ensure proper distribution of income, to prevent the domination of the 
market and the abuse of economic power, and to democratise the 
economy through harmony among the economic agents. 
In truth, however, administrative guidance was complex, opaque and often legally 
irregular. Discipline was imposed through explicit regulations, tacit threats of 
unfavorable treatment in the future, by intimidating use of punitive tax audits, and 
sometimes by cynical abuse of the criminal justice system (West 1998: 328). 
Administrative guidance had been ubiquitous in Korea going back to the 1960s, of 
course, but its very breadth of activity made defining it quite difficult. Thus one of 
Korea’s leading legal authorities, Sang-Hyun Song, wrote that there is  
no clear definition of administrative guidance. It is generally understood 
that the Korean government will exert its authority under regulatory and 
criminal laws to provide protection or to prevent violations… The 
Korean government has exercised and still exercises wide regulation 
over the Korean business community. Such control is possible as a result 
of the government’s authority to grant business licenses, and its direct or 
indirect influence on financing [with respect to] the specific industry. 
Furthermore, suggestions or requests from the government that a 
company act or refrain from acting in a particular way are generally 
honored by businesses. Therefore, administrative guidance may be 
effective… . (Song 1996b: 1249) 
Real change can come—and has come—to Korea’s judiciary only from outside forces. 
Since the national protest mobilisation of June 1987, civil society has advanced rapidly 
and a proliferation of new laws has done much to democratise the judicial sphere: 
reform of government fiat under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), opening of 
politics through the Freedom of Information Act and the Information Protection Act, 
devolution of power from the center under the Local Autonomy Law, and the 
development of case law through the (finally) vitalised law-finding activities of the 
courts. Like Lazarus the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court sprang to life, 
trading  rigor mortis for habeus corpus and discovering an utterly unaccustomed 
penchant for judicial review and a theretofore invisible activism in examining the 
constitutionality of laws. 
This new-found judicial determination is attributable to the demands and pressures from 
an invigorated popular sphere, especially for good governance having both a better 
quality of performance and clear adherence to the principle of the rule of law. Citizen 
pressures, often in the form of suits filed against public authorities demanding that they 
do what the letter of the law long authorised them to do (something unheard of under   9
the dictators, even though all Korean constitutions going back to 1948 look liberal on 
paper), brought about the court reorganisation of 1994, established the Administrative 
Court in 1998, along with more recent reform measures that add up to a newly-
invigorated judicial function in Korea. The significance of these gains cannot be 
underestimated, since for forty years Korean judges and government officials 
themselves often felt unconstrained by the very laws that they were are called upon to 
implement, there having been so little force in the concept of ‘legal right’ in Korean law 
practice; even when there was evidence of good judicial intervention—or justice in the 
best sense—it rested upon ‘common sense’, ‘good will’, or the judge’s ‘benevolence’—
but not the ‘rights’ of the individual (Song 1996b: 1,246). 
The revitalization of the judiciary, however, has not meant an end of the era of 
administrative guidance. Under a democratic government, administrative guidance can 
be invoked, even if its uses today are often to correct the abuses of yesterday. Kim Dae 
Jung came to power in February 1998 as a result of the first truly important political and 
democratic transition in Korean history, and proceeded to use this informal mechanism 
of state interventionism to bring about the rule of law, Korean-style. The ‘rules of law’ 
that Kim wanted to champion in the economic sphere were: creating transparency in 
corporate governance, reducing excessive reliance on the banking system for capital, 
improving the financial structure of the conglomerates, separating ownership from 
management, giving labour a voice at the bargaining table, and improving minority 
shareholder rights. 
The best symbol of how administrative guidance went from stoking the Korean 
industrial economy to reforming it, in the process saving flagship firms from their own 
worst selves as the entire economy teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, is the industrial 
reorganisation of 1998 which proposed to find the comparative industrial advantage of 
each conglomerate and then demand that the firms stick to it. The end goal was to 
reduce over-investment by shrinking the number of firms in a given industry, thus 
forcing firms to focus on their ‘core competence’ after years of excess, redundant 
diversification. Kim’s reforms sought both to preserve the perceived comparative 
advantage of Korea’s chaebol in world markets, and to break the nexus of state and 
corporate power, which had gained its sustenance through capital provisioned by the 
government to the big firms in the form of huge state-mediated, preferentially-priced 
loans, something that had long been the distinguishing characteristic of the Korean 
model of development. 
In the worst of times Korean administrative guidance has been destructive of the rule of 
law, involving outright expropriation of property in the name of industrial 
reorganisation, such that Adam Smith’s hidden hand materialised as an all too 
conspicuous mailed fist; in ordinary times it has been the mundane, informal instrument 
of an intrusive executive power. But does that necessarily negate the value of 
administrative guidance, which in the best of times was the core architectonic force 
behind Korea’s rapid industrialisation? 
In the empyrean of the Hayekian rule of law, administrative guidance should be (at best) 
no more than the handmaiden of an arm’s-length, disinterested third-party justice, and 
even then it would be better if it simply did the right thing and abolished itself. But 
perhaps the Japanese precedents we surveyed earlier provide a more realistic roadmap 
toward how real-world AG can morph into a useful practice constrained by an evolving 
and ever-stronger form of judicial review or, as in the Korean case, an energized   10
populace. The alternative of a delayed and dilated euthanasia for Korean administrative 
guidance looks even better when we grasp that in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis it did 
in fact become an effective mechanism of reform, the intrusive arm of government that 
propelled financial restructuring, cleaned up corporate governance, and got economic 
growth back on track. Perhaps now we can look forward to administrative guidance 
finding a way to prepare its own deathbed. 
More like them: common law ‘Looks East’ 
Malaysia is a fascinating case to compare to Korea and Japan, given that it long had a 
more liberal market and a state based in a common law background that was less 
interventionist than Japan’s (let alone Korea’s), yet under Mahathir it developed the 
aspiration to be more like Japan and Korea (during the so-called ‘Look East’ strategy), 
and even though it failed in that effort, it succeeded in destroying its own common-law 
based constitution. How did it do so, and what happened to its British common law 
tradition? The simple answer is that Mahathir expanded the power of the executive and 
used it first to hamstring and then to demolish the judiciary. Law did not appear to be 
the ‘proxy’ for the state or the determinant of the state-market nexus as the LLSV 
scholars would claim, but quickly fell away before the advance of a powerful state. 
The legal basis of pre-colonial Malaya was customary and Islamic law, but it had a far 
longer period of exposure to British or common law than did many colonies, as British 
control lasted from 1874 to 1957. The post-independence legal system consisted 
basically of British law and some elements of Islamic law, which reflected the ethnic 
balance between Chinese businessmen and other non-Islamic groups, and the majority 
Malays who believe in Islam. Existing laws and statutory and judicial precedents bear 
the indelible marks of English common law and equity and what the colonial judges 
thought was just, fair, reasonable and equitable. The 1957 Federal constitution was 
drafted by the British Parliamentary draftsmen, broadly based on the Westminster 
Parliamentary model. 
The judiciary and the entire judicial process operated and is still operating under the 
profound influence of the English common law and equity, judicial precedents, 
principles, ideas and concepts. Even today venerations to the views, observations and 
comments of the British judges is very much prominent in the Courts decisions. The 
polity had a number of major democratic features, such as regular elections contested by 
independent parties, a parliament to which the government is responsive, and a 
constitutionally independent judiciary (Biddle and Milor 1999: 11). If the organised bar 
was small, countervailing legal efforts to control the government’s growing power were 
rule-based. Administrative law, as interpreted by the courts, provided rudimentary 
controls over the government; judicial independence was high; and judges were as 
career appointees and not at that time part of the political majority. 
Despite the trappings of democracy, though, the actual limitations on democratic 
process were many. When a twelve-year state of emergency, originally announced to 
fight a communist insurgency, ended in 1960, the government implemented an Internal 
Security Act (ISA) allowing detention without trial. Following racial riots in 1969, and 
a temporary suspension of Parliament, authoritarian controls were expanded. The ISA 
and other government measures, such as the Sedition Act and Official Secrets Act,   11
continued to hamper the exercise of democratic political rights, especially free 
expression. But these limitations on Malaysia’s democracy were not fatal, and until the 
1980s most observers applauded the functioning of its democratic system. The same 
was true of the economic system, formed in a common-law incubator. 
As the Malaysian economy began to take off in the 1960s laws and legal procedures 
were ‘market-allocative’ and rule-based. In this period the procedures reflected a rights-
based approach to internal government controls, and laws provided for the regulation of 
various professions (accounting, architecture, engineering, and so on). There was also a 
mix of state and market-allocative laws to support the government’s economic strategy. 
Concomitant with the ‘Look East’ policy in 1981, however, abuses of public office 
grew, and the legal system was used extensively to implement policy. More laws 
conferring discretionary power to the Executive were adopted than in any previous time 
since Malaysian independence. A common feature of these legislations was the 
confiding of exclusive discretionary power upon the Minister to make decisions, 
coupled with a right to enact subsidiary legislation to better administer the statute; it 
also carried the ubiquitous finality clause that made his decisions final and conclusive 
with no right of review (Das 1981). 
The Malaysian state frankly adopted the Japanese and Korean model, claiming that 
there was a trade-off between economic growth and democracy. The policy was anti-
Western, and more especially, anti-British. Prime Minister Mahathir pursued an 
interventionist strategy partially modelled on South Korea’s Heavy and Chemical 
Industries industrial policy of the early 1970s, involving close collaboration between the 
government and big business. What was ‘Malaysia Inc.’ supposed to look like? 
The Malaysian government established HICOM (Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia) to diversify manufacturing activity, increase local linkages, and generate 
local technological capacity. HICOM, however, suffered significant financial losses, 
and these, combined with a deterioration in the terms of trade (fueled by drops in world 
prices for major commodities such as petroleum and palm oil) and increasing external 
debt, alongside a slump in external demand in primary commodities and electronics and 
curtailed demand for steel, cement and cars, occasioned a recession lasting from late 
1984 until 1987. As a consequence, Malaysia experienced negative growth rates, and 
investments, both public and private, dropped precipitously. In other words Malaysia 
tried to be Korea and it all ended in an embarrassing and massive failure, a fortunate 
outcome for rule-of-law believers attributable, among other things, to crashingly bad 
timing. Many of the firms the state has sponsored proved to be inefficient, usually due 
to cronyism, but also because there were simply too many competing firms in the region 
(Pillay 2000: 209). 
But the economic failure did not stop Mahathir from decisively defeating judicial 
activism, at the hands of the executive; basically the independence of the judiciary was 
destroyed in a few years in the late 1980s. Let us trace this a little bit. Previously Article 
4(1) of the Constitution had proclaimed the Constitution to be supreme, and borrowing 
from the US model, allocated certain powers, including judicial review, to the 
Malaysian courts. Judicial review was also one of the five pillars of the national 
ideology, called the Rukunegara: ‘The rule of law is ensured by the existence of an 
independent judiciary with powers to pronounce on the constitutionality and legality or 
otherwise of executive acts’ (Milne and Mauzy 1999: 46).   12
The year preceding the crippling of the judiciary saw a great deal of judicial activism, 
with a number of important decisions going against the government. For example, in 
1986 the judiciary upheld a challenge against a government expulsion order against a 
foreign journalist; in 1987 it granted habeas corpus to an ISA detainee; but the upshot 
of this judicial activism (or resistance) was that Mahathir, who had encountered no 
resistance in the cabinet or the Parliament, felt that he faced resistance only from the 
judiciary—and so judicial independence had to go. Mahathir got much assistance from 
the Parliament, which passed the Federal Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1988, 
removing the powers of the judiciary from the Constitution, deeming instead that they 
would be conferred by parliament through statutory decree. By this Act, the Courts were 
summarily stripped of the power of judicial review previously granted in the 
Constitution (Milne and Mauzy 1999: 47). 
Observers were understandably shocked that the whole judicial system could so easily 
be transformed, but Mahathir claimed that he was merely guarding the prerogatives of 
the legislature to ‘develop the law’ (Khoo 1995: 288). In general, laws which at first 
blush seemed to undergird the power of the judiciary and various checks and balances, 
over time were used to entrench the executive’s power. Rule-making in the executive 
expanded as its economic activism spread, despite the significant growth of lawyers in 
the economy (almost 6,000 advocates and solicitors in the country by the end of 1995) 
(Pistor and Wellons 1999: 91). 
In short, there is precious little in the Malaysian case to suggest that the heritage of 
common law, a carefully-crafted democratic constitution, or several decades of human 
experience with the workings of the rule of law, offered much of an obstacle to an 
authoritarian reworking of the system. It seems more likely that Korea, moving out of 
its authoritarian path even as it uses the mechanisms of state intervention to do so, 
comes much closer to democracy and to an effective form of the rule of law than does 
Malaysia, going in the opposite direction. In any event neither the Korean nor the 
Malaysian case offers much support for the idea that learning how to act according to 
the ideal of disinterested third-party rule enforcement will ever be a simple or easy 
process of hearkening to the scholars and then acting accordingly. 
Conclusion: the right institutions 
The concern with law and economic governance is part and parcel of the ‘second 
generation reform’, which in the words of the former President of the World Bank, 
James Wolfensohn (1999), refers to ‘the structure of the right institutions, of the 
improvement of the administrative, legal, and regulatory functions of the state, 
addressing the incentives and actions that are required to have private sector 
development and to develop the institutional capacity for reforms’. First generation 
reform had focused on economic policies designed to make markets work more 
efficiently—’pricing, exchange rate and interest rate reforms, tax and expenditure 
reforms and the establishment of rudimentary market institutions’ (Camdessus 1999)—
but with the second wave the very structure of law and government, that is, politics 
came to the fore. 
I have argued that this new emphasis on law, conceived as an elixir for developing and 
transitional countries, cannot solve the vexing problems of politics and development.   13
However admirable in its intentions, the new World Bank perspective draws on a 
peculiarly Anglo-American discourse and experience, generalising on the basis of a set 
of governmental institutions that are themselves anomalous survivors in the twenty-first 
century—this state form that Samuel Huntington once called the ‘Tudor polity’ (1968). 
As the Federalist Papers long ago noted, the point of this state form was to disperse and 
confine political power, to divide it into three branches of government that would check 
and balance each other, to have the legislators keep an eye on the executive, the local 
states corral and confine the central government, and the judges watch them all. It was a 
form of politics suitable to an agrarian economy of yeoman farmers, and as that 
economy slowly became urban and industrial, no less than Thomas Jefferson 
condemned this transformation in the name of the pastoral ideals that underlay his 
conception of American governance. That was more than 200 years ago, of course, and 
for the past 150 years the central problem was not how to restrain power, but how to 
create it in the first place. Ever since, the problem of good governance has been how to 
comprehend and deal with the large bureaucratic central states that emerged in the 
context of industrialisation—either to further the growth of industry, as in Germany and 
Japan, or to reign in the excesses of industrial capitalism, as in the American New Deal. 
I think the real problem—the actually-existing practical conundrum of good policy—is 
how to find effective tools to realise the substance of arm’s-length, third-party 
governance in the existing context of strong states that may not be ‘the right 
institutions’, but happen to be the ones we have to work with in the real world. We have 
to find ways to achieve the admirable goals of transparency, accountability and 
disinterested justice without expecting to mimic a set of institutions developed in the 
tranquil, bucolic ambience of the eighteenth century; often this will be a matter of 
creatively utilising those ‘wrong institutions’ that were the sources of past 
developmental success, like the heritage of administrative guidance that I focused on in 
this chapter. As the contemporary Korean case makes clear, tools of strong state 
intervention can be an effective expedient to achieve the goals of second-generation 
reform; Kim Dae Jung has wielded these tools against the big banks and the big chaebol 
firms, but has also used the state to reform the state (as with the increasing effectiveness 
of judicial review and prosecutorial activism), and has used the people (in the form of 
new citizen groups) to pressure the state, all in the name of reform. 
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